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Maximum Damage Malware Attack in Mobile Wireless Networks
Abstract
Malware attacks constitute a serious security risk that threatens to slow down the large scale
proliferation of wireless applications. As a first step towards thwarting this security threat, we seek to
quantify the maximum damage inflicted on the system owing to such outbreaks and identify the most
vicious attacks. We represent the propagation of malware in a battery-constrained mobile wireless
network by an epidemic model in which the worm can dynamically control the rate at which it kills the
infected node and also the transmission range and/or the media scanning rate. At each moment of time,
the worm at each node faces the following trade-offs: (i) using larger transmission range and media
scanning rate to accelerate its spread at the cost of exhausting the battery and thereby reducing the
overall infection propagation rate in the long run or (ii) killing the node to inflict a large cost on the
network, however at the expense of loosing the chance of infecting more susceptible nodes at later times.
We mathematically formulate the decision problems and utilize Pontryagin Maximum Principle from
optimal control theory to quantify the damage that the malware can inflict on the network by deploying
optimum decision rules. Next, we establish structural properties of the optimal strategy of the attacker
over time. Specifically, we prove that it is optimal for the attacker to defer killing of the infective nodes in
the propagation phase for a certain time and then start the slaughter with maximum effort. We also show
that in the optimal attack policy, the battery resources are used according to a decreasing function of
time, i.e., mostly during the initial phase of the outbreak. Finally, our numerical investigations reveal a
framework for identifying intelligent defense strategies that can limit the damage by appropriately
selecting network parameters.
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Maximum Damage Malware Attack in Mobile
Wireless Networks
M.H.R Khouzani, Saswati Sarkar, Eitan Altman

Abstract—Malware attacks constitute a serious security risk
that threatens to slow down the large scale proliferation of
wireless applications. As a first step towards thwarting this
security threat, we seek to quantify the maximum damage
inflicted on the system owing to such outbreaks and identify the
most vicious attacks. We represent the propagation of malware
in a battery-constrained mobile wireless network by an epidemic
model in which the worm can dynamically control the rate
at which it kills the infected node and also the transmission
range and/or the media scanning rate. At each moment of time,
the worm at each node faces the following trade-offs: (i) using
larger transmission range and media scanning rate to accelerate
its spread at the cost of exhausting the battery and thereby
reducing the overall infection propagation rate in the long run
or (ii) killing the node to inflict a large cost on the network,
however at the expense of loosing the chance of infecting more
susceptible nodes at later times. We mathematically formulate
the decision problems and utilize Pontryagin Maximum Principle
from optimal control theory to quantify the damage that the
malware can inflict on the network by deploying optimum
decision rules. Next, we establish structural properties of the
optimal strategy of the attacker over time. Specifically, we prove
that it is optimal for the attacker to defer killing of the infective
nodes in the propagation phase for a certain time and then start
the slaughter with maximum effort. We also show that in the
optimal attack policy, the battery resources are used according
to a decreasing function of time, i.e., mostly during the initial
phase of the outbreak. Finally, our numerical investigations reveal
a framework for identifying intelligent defense strategies that can
limit the damage by appropriately selecting network parameters.

I. I NTRODUCTION
a) Motivation: Malicious self-replicating codes, known
as malware, pose substantial threat to the wireless computing
infrastructure. Malware can be used to launch attacks that vary
from the less intrusive confidentiality or privacy attacks, such
as traffic analysis and eavesdropping, to the more intrusive
methods that either disrupt the nodes normal functions such
as those in relaying data and establishing end-to-end routes
(e.g., sinkhole attacks [1]), or even alter the network traffic and
hence destroy the integrity of the information, such as unauthorized access and session hijacking attacks [2], [3]. Malware
outbreaks like those of Slammer [4] and Code Red [5] worms
in wired Internet have already inflicted expenses of billions of
dollars in repair after the viruses rapidly infected thousands
of hosts within few hours. New investments have increasingly
been directed toward wireless infrastructure thanks to the rapid
growth of consumer demands and advancements in wireless
technologies. The economic viability of these investments
M. H. R Khouzani and Saswati Sarkar are at the Electrical and Systems Engineering Department of University of Pennsylvania. Their emails
are {khouzani,swati} @seas.upenn.edu. Eitan Altman is at INRIA, Sophia
Antipolis, France. His email is altman@sophia.inria.fr

is, however, contingent on the design of effective security
countermeasures.
The first step in devising efficient countermeasures is to
anticipate malware hazards, and understand the threats they
pose, before they emerge in the hands of the attackers [6].
Recognizing the above, specific attacks such as the wormhole
[7], sinkhole [1], and Sybil [8], that utilize vulnerabilities in
the routing protocols in a wireless sensor network, and their
counter-measures, have been investigated before they were
actually launched. We pursue the complementary but closely
related goals of (i) quantifying fundamental limits on the
damages that the attackers can inflict by intelligently choosing
their actions, and (ii) identifying the optimal actions that inflict
the maximum damage on the network. Such quantification is
motivated by the fact that while attackers can pose serious
threats by exploiting the fundamental limitations of wireless
network, such as limited energy, unreliable communication,
constant changes in topology owing to mobility [9], their
capabilities may well be limited by the above as well since
they rely on the same network for propagating the malware.
Finally, the answers will depend on the network parameters
such as communication ranges of the nodes, mobility parameters, and also the counter-measure parameters such as the rates
of updates of security patches, etc. This will in turn suggest
appropriate counter-measures which minimize overall network
costs that depend on the costs of the counter-measures and the
damages inflicted by the malware.
b) Decision problems of the attackers: Worms spread
during data or control message transmission from nodes that
are infected (infectives) and those that are vulnerable, but not
yet infected (susceptibles). We consider a pernicious worm
that may (i) eavesdrop, (ii) analyze, (iii) alter or destroy
traffic and (iv) disrupt the infective host’s normal functions
(such as relaying data or establishing routes), and even kill
the host, that is, render it completely dysfunctional (dead).
This killing process may be triggered by performing a code
which inflicts irretrievable hardware damage. For instance,
Chernobyl virus [10] could re-flesh the BIOS, corrupting the
bootstrap program required to initialize the system. The worm
can determine the time to kill, or equivalently the rate of killing
the hosts, by regulating the rate at which it triggers such codes.
Counter-measures can be launched by installing security
patches that either immunize susceptible nodes against future
attacks, by rectifying their underlying vulnerability, or heal
the infectives of the infection and render them robust against
future attacks. For instance, for SQL-Slammer worms [4],
while StackGuard programs [11] immunize the susceptibles
by removing the buffer overflow vulnerability that the worms
exploit, specialized security patches [12] are required to re-

move the worm from (and thereby heal) the infectives. Nodes
that have been immunized or healed are denoted as recovered.
Thus, depending on whether the worm kills the infective
before it fetches a security-patch, the state of an infective
changes to dead or recovered. States of susceptible nodes
change to infective or recovered depending on whether they
communicate with infectives before installing the securitypatches. Note that the counter-measures incur costs, since the
patches must be obtained through the bandwidth-limited wireless media involving energy-expensive communications, and
different patches incur different costs depending on whether
they treat susceptibles or infectives. Thus, such countermeasures must be resorted to, selectively and judiciously.
The goal of the attacker is to infect as many nodes as
possible, and use the worms to disrupt the hosts as well as
the network functions, while being cognizant of the countermeasures [13]. Killing an infective host sooner rather than later
maximally disrupts its functions and thereby inflicts damage
on the network right away, but also prevents it from propagating the infection in the network and eavesdropping, analyzing,
altering or destroying network traffic. Deferral of killing, on
the other hand, may allow the host to be healed of the infection
before it can be killed or infect other hosts. It is therefore
interesting to determine the instantaneous rate of killing that
maximizes the damage inflicted by the worm. Another important decision of the worm pertains to its optimal use of
the available energy of the infective nodes. The infectives can
accelerate the rate of spread of the worm by increasing their
contact rates with susceptibles by selecting higher transmission
gains and media scanning rates. Such choice however depletes
their energy reserves which are limited as those of any other
nodes in wireless networks, which in turn limits the spread
of the infection and also their other functionalities such as
eavesdropping, traffic destruction, etc.
c) Contributions: The fundamental contributions of this
paper are threefold. First, we construct a mathematical framework which cogently models the effect of the decisions of
the attackers on the state dynamics and their resulting tradeoffs through a combination of epidemic models and damage
functions (Section II). Specifically, we assume that the damage
inflicted by the worm is a cumulative function increasing in
the number of infected and dead hosts, both of which change
with time. We allow the function to be fairly general, in that
it can be either linear or non-linear, and consider that the
worm seeks to maximize the damage subject to satisfying
certain constraints on the energy consumption of its hosts
by dynamically selecting its killing rates and energy usages
of its hosts while assuming full knowledge of the network
parameters and the counter-measures. The maximum value of
the damage function then quantifies the fundamental limits
on the efficacy of the worm, particularly, since we assume
that the worm has complete knowledge of all the contributing
factors, and uses optimal dynamic strategies. The damage
maximization problem turns out to be an elegant optimal
control problem which can be solved numerically by applying
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle [14]–[16] - an effective tool
that so far has been rarely used in the context of network
security (Section III).

Second, we seek to answer the natural next question of
whether in practice the worm can indeed inflict the damage
quantified above, or the above quantifications constitute only
theoretical upper bounds. Specifically, if the optimal policies
that inflict the above maximum damage are complex to execute, then the worm may not be able to execute them since they
are limited by the capabilities of their resource constrained
hosts as well. Towards this end, we investigate structures of the
optimum policies for the worms. Our results are surprising and
have negative connotations from the counter-measures point of
view since we show that an attacker can inflict the maximum
damage by using very simple decisions. We first investigate
the case where the worm selects the killing rates dynamically
and the energy consumption strategies statically (i.e., once at
the beginning of network operation) (Section IV). We prove
that the optimal killing rate has the following simple structure:
until a certain time (which can be zero depending on the
network and counter-measure parameters), the worm does not
kill any host, and right after that, it annihilates its hosts at
the maximum possible rate until the end of the optimization
period (Theorem 1). Thus, the first phase is to amass the
infectives and then arrives the slaughter time. The result
carries a qualitative cautionary message for countermeasures
as well: an apparently inoffensive malware with little to no
disruptive behavior might well be stacking infective hosts for
the imminent carnage. In optimal control terminology [14]–
[16], we have proved that the optimal strategy has a bangbang structure, that is, at any given time, the killing rate is
either at its minimum or maximum possible values; in addition
it has at most one jump which necessarily culminates at the
maximum possible value. Optimality of this simple strategy
for this nontrivial problem is in fact quite surprising.
We next investigate the complementary problem where
the worm selects only the optimal energy consumption rate
dynamically (Section V). We prove that when the energy
consumption costs are convex the worm’s optimal energy
consumption rate is a decreasing function of time (Theorem 2).
Thus, the worm seeks to infect as many hosts as possible early
on by selecting the maximum possible values of the media
scanning rates and transmission ranges, and thereafter starts
to behave more conservatively so as to satisfy the energy
consumption constraints. This inevitably slows the further
spread of the worm towards the end of the optimization period,
but then a large fraction of nodes have already been infected
due to the choice of large values of these parameters early
on. When the energy consumption costs are concave, the
structure results are even more specific: the optimal media
scanning rates and transmission ranges are not only decreasing
functions of time, but also have a bang-bang nature with
at most one jump from the maximum possible value to the
minimum possible value. Our numerical computations reveal
that when both the killing rates and energy usages are selected
dynamically, the optimal strategies follow the above structures
as well (Section VI).
Finally, we demonstrate how an understanding of the maximum value of the damage function can facilitate the design
of suitable counter-measures. Our numerical computations
affirm that as expected the damage can be reduced if the

nodes fetch the security patches at the maximum possible rate
(Section VI). However, this incurs cost for the system owing
to the energy-expensive communication of the patches through
bandwidth-limited wireless media. We devise a framework for
determining the above parameter so as to minimize the overall
network cost which increases with the damage and the cost
associated with installation rate of the security patches.
d) Related Works: Malware outbreaks in wireless networks constitute an emerging research topic (e.g., [17]–[21]),
though, the research on spread of malware has traditionally
focused on wired networks. Epidemic modeling based on the
classic Kermack-Mckendrick model [22] has extensively been
used to analyze the spread of malware in wired networks [5],
[23], [24], etc, and more recently in wireless networks [25].
These works show, through simulations and matching with
actual data, that when the number of nodes in a network
is large, the deterministic epidemic models can successfully
represent the dynamics of the spread of the malware.
Dynamic control of parameters of the network or the
worm have been investigated in several papers. Most of
these however do not identify the optimal policies nor provide provable performance guarantees, but instead propose
heuristic dynamic policies in different contexts, and evaluate
through simulations the efficacies and various trade-offs of the
policies they propose. For example, [24] proposes heuristics
for dynamic quarantining of nodes in wired networks that
appear suspicious through traffic analysis, and [26] introduces
heuristic strategies for dynamically adjusting the transmission
power of attacker nodes in wireless networks. We instead
obtain attack policies that provably attain the maximum possible damage and consider a general model that incorporates
healing, immunization and mortality of nodes.
Interestingly, tools from the optimal control theory such as
the effective theorem of Pontryagin maximum Principle has
rarely been used for analyzing network security - [27] and
our previous work [28] constitute notable exceptions. The first
formulates the trade-off for optimal treatment of the infective
nodes in wired networks. However, in contrast to our work,
the solution is based on numerical evaluations only and no
structural property of the optimal policy is established. Our
earlier work [28] proposes reduction of reception gain of
wireless nodes as a counter-measure for slowing down the
spread of malware in wireless networks. Our current work
in contrast focuses on the attack viewpoint and considers the
transmission range of the infective nodes and the rate of killing
as dynamic parameters of the worm to inflict the maximum
damage, and therefore invokes and answers a different set of
questions using different analytical arguments. Also the model
assumed here is more general than in [27], [28] in that the
worm causes mortality and the counter-measures include both
healing and immunization.
II. S YSTEM M ODEL
A. Dynamics of State Evolution
A susceptible node is a mobile wireless device which is not
contaminated by the worm, but is prone to infection. A node
is infective if it is contaminated by the worm. An infective
spreads the worm to a susceptible while transmitting data or

control messages to it. The worm can kill an infective host, i.e.,
render it completely dysfunctional - such nodes are denoted
dead. A functional node that is immune to the worm is referred
to as recovered. Installation of appropriate security patches,
by the respective users or the network operator, can immunize
susceptibles to the recovered states and heal infectives to the
recovered states. Different security patches may be required
for immunization and healing as the first involves rectification
of the vulnerability that rendered the susceptibles culpable to
the attack, whereas the second involves both the removal of
the worm and the vulnerability that the worm exploits.
Let the total number of nodes in the network be N . Let the
number of susceptible, infective, recovered and dead nodes at
time t be denoted by nS (t), nI (t), nR (t) and nD (t), respectively, and the corresponding fractions be S(t) = nS (t)/N,
I(t) = nI (t)/N, R(t) = nR (t)/N, and D(t) = nD (t)/N
respectively. Then, S(t) + I(t) + R(t) + D(t) = 1. We assume
that at the time of the outbreak of the infection, that is at time
zero, some but not all nodes are infected: 0 < I(0) = I0 < 1.
For simplicity, we assume R(0) = D(0) = 0. Thus, S(0) =
1 − I0 .
We now model the dynamics of infection propagation.
Nodes are assumed to roam in a vast 2-D region of area A with
an average velocity v. An infective transmits a message to a
susceptible with a given probability whenever the two are in
contact, that is, the susceptible is in the transmission range of
the infective. Now, this probability is a linear function of the
rate at which the infective scans the media in search of susceptibles nearby, and the proportionality constant is determined by
the message collision probability η1 . When the communication
range of the nodes is small compared to A (which is usually
the case in multihop networks), η1 is essentially determined by
the overall node density (N/A). Next, under mobility models
such as random waypoint or random direction model [29],
Groenevelt et al. [30] have shown that the time between
consecutive contacts of a specific pair of nodes is nearly
exponentially distributed, and the rate of this exponential
process is linearly dependent1 on the communication range
of the nodes with a proportionality constant η2 that depends
1
only on v and A. Specifically, η2 ∝ A
. Let u(t) be the product
of the infective’s transmission range and its media scanning
rate. Then, the worm is transmitted between a given infectivesusceptible pair as per an exponential random process whose
rate at any given time t is β̂u(t), where β̂ = η1 η2 . The
worm regulates the spread of the infection by controlling u(t)
through appropriate choice of its transmission gain and media
scanning rate.
We now model the dynamics of mortality, healing and immunization. The worm at an infective host kills the host after a
random time which is exponentially distributed with rate ν(t)
at any given time t. Here, the worm regulates the death process
by appropriately choosing the instantaneous rate of killing
ν(t) at t; this is accomplished by invoking and executing the
code that kills the node at desired rates. The security patches
are installed at an infective (susceptible, respectively) after
1 The result has been proved when the communication range of the nodes
is small compared to the total area of the region and v is sufficiently high.
Numerical computations reveal that the result holds even otherwise.

exponentially distributed random times starting from when
it is infected (t = 0, respectively). The delays account for
the time required in detection of infection, and fetching the
appropriate security patch, etc. The instantaneous rates of these
exponential healing and immunization processes for any given
infective at any given time t are B (I(t)) and Q (S(t)) , respectively, where B(.), Q(.) are arbitrary functions that satisfy
the following mild assumptions: limx→0 B(x), limx→0 Q(x)
are finite, and for 0 < x < 1, B(x), Q(x) are positive and
differentiable, xB(x) is a concave non-decreasing function
of x and xQ(x) is a non-decreasing function of x. Note
that the functions B(.) and Q(.) are likely to be constants
(e.g., B(x) = B0 , Q(x) = Q0 for all x), in practice2 , and
any constant function satisfies all of the above properties.
Nevertheless, we consider more general functions (such as
Q(x) = xα for α > −1 and B(x) = xα for −1 < α < 0) so
as to allow for more general scenarios.
Following the conditions assumed for the model, the number
of nodes of each type evolves according to a pure jump
Markov chain with state vector (nS (t), nI (t), nD (t)) (since
for all t, nS (t) + nI (t) + nR (t) + nD (t) = N, the state of the
Markov chain is three dimensional). Let
β = lim N β̂,
N →∞

q(S) = Q(S)S,

b(I) = B(I)I.

Now3 according to the results of [31], as N grows, S(t), I(t)
and D(t) converge to the solution of the following system of
differential equations4:
Ṡ(t) = −βu(t)I(t)S(t) − q (S(t)) , S(0) = 1 − I0 (1a)
˙ = βuI(t)S(t) − b (I(t)) − ν(t)I(t), I(0) = I0 (1b)
I(t)
Ḋ(t) = ν(t)I(t),

D(0) = 0.

(1c)

and also satisfy the following constraints at all t:
0 ≤ S(t), I(t), D(t)
S(t) + I(t) + D(t) ≤ 1.

(2a)
(2b)

The convergence is in the following sense:
∀ ǫ > 0 ∀ t > 0,

lim Pr{sup |

N →∞

τ ≤t

nS (τ )
− S(τ )| > ǫ} = 0
N

and likewise for I(t) and D(t).
Similar epidemic models have been validated through experiments as well as network simulations to provide an acceptable
representation of the spread of malware in mobile wireless
networks (see e.g. [32], [33]).
Henceforth, wherever not ambiguous, for legibility, we drop
the dependence on t and make it implicit. Fig. 1 illustrates the
transitions between different states of nodes.
2 This is because the users of infectives and susceptibles are likely to receive
the security patches from software stores or servers distributed in the area A.
In the first case, the rates are clearly constants. In the latter case, the reception
rates of the patches depend on the host’s reception gains, servers’ transmission
gains, collision probabilities etc, and none of the above depend on the infective
and susceptible fractions (collision probability depends on the overall node
density N/A).
3 Note that since β̂ = η η , and η depends only on the node density, and
1 2
1
1
η2 ∝ A
, the limit β exists as long as the node density limN→∞ N/A exists
for large N.
4 Variables with dot marks (e.g., Ṡ(t)) will represent their time derivatives
(e.g., time derivative of S(t)) and the prime signs (e.g., q ′ (S)) designate their
derivatives with respect to their argument (e.g., S).
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Fig. 1: Transitions. S, I, R, D respectively represent fraction of the
susceptible, infective, recovered and dead.

Finally, owing to the technical assumptions we made on
B(.) and Q(.), the functions b(.), q(.) exhibit the following
properties: b(0) = q(0) = 0, and for 0 < I < 1, 0 < S < 1
b(I), q(S) > 0, b′ (I) = db/ dI ≥ 0, q ′ (S) = dq/ dS ≥ 0,
and b′′ (I) = d2 b/ dI 2 ≤ 0.
B. Maximum Damage Attack
We consider an attack that seeks to inflict the maximum
possible damage in a time window [0, T ] of its choice. An
attack can benefit over time from the infected hosts, by using
the worms to (i) eavesdrop and analyze traffic that is generated
or relayed by the infected hosts, or the traffic that traverses in
the hosts’ vicinity, and (ii) alter or destroy the traffic that is
generated or relayed by the infected hosts. An attacker also
benefits by inflicting a large death-toll by the end of the desired
time window. These motivate the following damage function:
Z T
J = κD(T ) +
f (I(t)) dt.
(3)
0

where κ is an arbitrary positive constant, and f (.) is an
arbitrary non-decreasing, convex function such that f (0) = 0.
Note that the assumptions on κ, f (.) are mild and natural,and
a large class of functions, e.g., f (I) = KI α for α ≥ 1 and
K ≥ 0, f (I) = K(eI − 1) for K ≥ 0 satisfy them. Finally,
an attacker that simply seeks to maximize the final tally of
the dead without any other agenda is readily representable by
taking f ≡ 0.
The attacker seeks to maximize the damage function by
appropriately regulating its killing rate ν(t) and the product
u(t) of the transmission range and the scanning rate of the
infective nodes5 subject to:
0 ≤ ν(t) ≤ νmax
Z T
h (u(t)) dt ≤ C

0 ≤ umin ≤ u(t) ≤ umax

(4a)
(4b)

0

The bound on ν(t) is imposed by limitations on the worm’s
speed of killing an infective host. The bounds on u(t) are
dictated by the physical constraints of the transmitters and
also for ensuring that the interference and hence collisions between simultaneous transmissions remain limited. The second
constraint (battery constraint) arises because enhancing u(t)
depletes the infective’s battery, and the worm needs to ensure
5 The attacker does not control any other parameter such as the susceptible’s
reception gain, server’s transmission gains, mobility patterns, immunization
and healing rate functions, Q(.) and B(.) etc.

that the infective’s battery lasts and it can continue to use it and
to infect susceptibles for the time period of its operation [0, T ]
(should it choose not to kill the host earlier). For
R Tappropriate
functions, h(.) (e.g., h(u) = K1 ur , for r ≥ 2), 0 h(u(t)) dt
is the energy consumed by the host if it is infected at t = 0
and is not killed before t = T - this is therefore an upper
bound on the energy consumption of any infective while it
remains infected. We assume that the susceptibles use their
battery so as to last much longer than T , and therefore the
energy consumed by a host before it is infected is relatively
insignificant. Thus, the worm chooses u(t) so that the above
upper bound is less than its energy reserve.
It is natural to assume that h(u) is non-decreasing and nonnegative. We allow h(u) to be either convex or concave for
umin ≤ u ≤ umax . Note that when h(u) represents power
dissipation associated with u, h(u) must be K1 ur , for r ≥ 2
and some non-negative K1 , and is therefore convex. But, if
h(u) represents a cost associated with power dissipation, then
it may be concave as well. Finally, without loss of generality,
h(umin ) = 0, as if h(umin ) > 0, we can equivalently consider
h(umin ) = 0, and reduce the bound C appropriately. Any pair
of piecewise continuous functions (ν, u) : [0, T ] → R2 such
that the left and right hand limits exist and that satisfy the
above constraints belongs to the control region denoted by Ω.
We next show that for any (ν, u) ∈ Ω, the state constraints
in (2) are automatically satisfied throughout (0 . . . T ]. Thus,
we ignore (2) henceforth.
Lemma 1: For any (ν, u) ∈ Ω, the state functions
(S, I, D) : [0, T ] → R3 that satisfy (1), also satisfy (2).
Moreover, S(t) ≥ (1 − I0 )e−K1 t > 0, I(t) ≥ I0 e−K2 t > 0
for t ∈ [0, T ] and some finite K1 , K2 .
The proof will reveal that K1
=
βumax +
max0≤x≤1 q ′ (x), K2 = max0≤x≤1 b′ (x). The proof is
similar to that of lemma 1 in [28], and is relegated to our
tech. report [34].
Once the control (ν, u) is selected, the system state vector
(S, I, D) is specified at all t as a solution to (1) and hence
the value of the damage function J is determined as well.
Thus, the control (ν, u) is considered only as a function of
time rather than that of the system states, and since the value
of J is determined only by the selection of (ν, u), we will
henceforth denote J as J(ν, u) instead.
The state and control functions pair ((S, I, D), (ν, u)) is
called an admissible pair if (i) (ν, u) is in Ω, i.e. satisfies (4),
(ii) (ν, u) is piecewise continuous such that the left and right
hand limits exist at the points of discontinuity, and (iii) (1)
hold. The function (ν, u) is then called an admissible control.
Let ((S, I, D), (ν, u)) be an admissible pair. If
J(ν, u) ≥ J(ν, u) for any admissible control (ν, u)
then ((S, I, D), (ν, u)) is called an optimal solution and (ν, u)
is called an optimal control of the problem.
In order to obtain fundamental bounds on the efficacy of
the attack, we assume that the attacker computes its optimal
control assuming full knowledge of the parameters of the
system, such as the mobility pattern, the reception gain of the
susceptibles and the healing and immunization rate functions
(B(.), Q(.)). We also assume that the system selects the above

parameters apriori and does not change them with time. The
damage can only be equal or lower if the counter-measures are
adaptive or the attacker does not know the above parameters.
III. W ORM ’ S OPTIMAL CONTROL
We now present a framework using which the worm can determine its optimal control functions (ν, u) and also compute
the maximum value of the damage function.
The main challenge in computing the optimal control is
that the differential equations (1) can be solved provided the
functions (ν, u) are known. Thus, the only approach seems to
be that of an exhaustive search on all functions (ν, u) in Ω.
This will require the evaluation of the damage function J(ν, u)
for each pair of such functions where the corresponding
(I, D) functions required in evaluating J(ν, u) are obtained
by solving (1) for each such pair. But, Ω consists of an
uncountably infinite number of such pairs, which rules out an
exhaustive search. Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle however
provides an elegant tool for solving this seemingly impossible
problem, which we apply next.
First, we introduce a new state variable E to transform the
constraint in (4b) to a more treatable one:
Ė(t) = −h(u),

E(0) = 0,

(5)

with the final constraint:
E(T ) ≥ −C.

(6)

Now, note that (5) and (6) are together equivalent to (4b).
Thus, the optimal control problem posed in section II can now
be modified to augment (1) with (5) and (6), and omit (4b),
without any alterations in the set of optimal solutions and in
the maximum value of the damage function. We consider this
version henceforth.
Let ((S, I, D), (ν, u)) be an optimal solution. Consider the
Hamiltonian H, and co-state or adjoint functions λ1 (t) to
λ4 (t), and a scalar λ0 ≥ 0 defined as follows:
H := λ0 f (I) + (λ2 − λ1 )βuIS − λ1 q(S) − λ2 b(I)
+(λ3 − λ2 )νI − λ4 h(u).
∂H
∂S
∂H
λ̇2 = −
∂I
∂H
λ̇3 = −
∂D
∂H
λ̇4 = −
∂E
λ̇1 = −

(7)

= −(λ2 − λ1 )βuI + λ1 q ′
= −λ0 f ′ − (λ2 − λ1 )βuS + λ2 b′ − (λ3 − λ2 )ν
=0
= 0.
(8)

along with the transversality conditions:
λ1 (T ) = 0, λ2 (T ) = 0,
λ4 (T ) ≥ 0
λ4 (T )(E(T ) + C) = 0.

λ3 (T ) = λ0 κ

(9a)
(9b)
(9c)

Then according to Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle With
Terminal Constraints ( [14, P.111 theorem 3.14]), there exists
continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable co-state
functions λ1 , λ2 , λ3 and λ4 , and constant λ0 ≥ 0 that at every

point t ∈ [0 . . . T ] where (ν(.), u(.)) is continuous satisfy (8),
and the transversality conditions (9), and we have:
~λ 6≡ ~0

(10a)

(ν, u) ∈ arg max H(~λ, (S, I, D), (ν, u))
(ν,u)∈Ω

(10b)

From (10b), (ν, u) must be selected to ensure that (λ3 −
λ2 )νI is maximized, and ∂H
∂u = 0. Since I > 0 (lemma 1),
ν = max(λ3 − λ2 , 0)νmax
and for convex h(u),


ψ ≤ h′ (umin )
umin ,

u = h′−1 (ψ), h′ (umin ) < ψ ≤ h′ (umax )



umax ,
h′ (umax ) < ψ.

(11a)

(11b)

where ψ := (λ2 − λ1 )βIS/λ4 . Combining (8), (11) and
(9), we obtain a system of (non-linear) differential equations
with final values specified that involve only the state and costate functions (and not the control (ν, u)). Functions λ1 to
λ4 and scalar λ0 that satisfy the above differential equations
and final values, can therefore be obtained using standard
numerical procedures that solve differential equations [35].
Now, the optimal control (ν, u) can be obtained using the
above solutions in (11).
Here, we obtain the following properties of the Hamiltonian,
and system states, that we use later.
First, the system is autonomous, i.e., the Hamiltonian and
the control region do not have an explicit dependency on the
independent variable t.Thus, [15, P.236]
H(S(t), I(t), D(t), ν(t), λ1 (t), λ2 (t), λ3 (t)) ≡ constant.
(12)
Second, we have the following lemma:.
Lemma 2: (f ′ (I)I − f (I)) ≥ 0 and (b(I) − b′ (I)I) ≥ 0 for
all t ∈ [0 . . . T ].
Proof: By lemma 1, I and S are nonnegative. Define
ξ(I) = f ′ (I)I − f (I). Since f (0) = 0, we have ξ(0) = 0.
d
Also,
ξ(I) = ξ ′ = f ′′ (I)I + f ′ (I) − f ′ (I) = f ′′ (I)I. FoldI
lowing lemma 1 and properties of f, we observe that ξ ′ ≥ 0 for
all t ∈ [0 . . . T ]. Thus, since ξ(0) = 0, ξ(I) = f ′ (I)−f (I)I ≥
0 for all t ∈ [0 . . . T ]. Likewise for b.
IV. O PTIMAL RATE OF KILLING
In this section, we consider the case in which the transmission range and media scanning rate in the infective nodes
is selected a priori by the worm and is fixed throughout
the [0 . . . T ] interval. Specifically, u(t) = u0 > 0, for all
t ∈ [0 . . . T ], and u0 is chosen such that the constraint (4b)
is satisfied, i.e., h(u0 ) ≤ C/T. Therefore, the state function
E and thus, the co-state function λ4 need not be introduced.
Thus, without loss of generality, λ4 ≡ 0 in (8).
We obtain structural results for the optimal killing rate ν(.)
as a function of time, that maximizes the overall damage
function in (3). Specifically, Theorem 1 shows that ν(.) is of
bang-bang form, that is, it possesses only two possible values
νmax and 0, and switches abruptly between them. It has at
most one such jump, which necessarily culminates at νmax .

Theorem 1: When u(t) = u0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], such that
u0 ∈ [umin , umax ] and u0 satisfies constraint (4b), the optimal
ν(t) that maximizes the worm’s damage function in (3) is
characterized as follows: ∃t1 ∈ [0 . . . T ) such that ν(t) = 0
for 0 < t < t1 and ν(t) = νmax for t1 < t < T.
Proof: First, we assume, without loss of generality,
λ0 = 1. This is because if λ0 > 0, then the Hamiltonian,
H, can be can be re-scaled by 1/λ0 , and by replacing λi /λ0 ,
i = 1 . . . 4 instead of λ1 . . . λ4 , the conditions of Pontryagin
Maximum Principle are satisfied for λ0 = 1. On the other
hand, if λ0 = 0 then (7) constitutes a linear autonomous ODE
with the final constraint of ~λ(T ) = ~0 which, from vector space
theory [35], has the unique solution of (λ1 , . . . , λ4 ) = ~0 for all
t ∈ [0 . . . T ]. This however contradicts the necessary condition
of ~λ 6≡ ~0 of (10a).
Let the switching function, ϕ, be defined as follows:
ϕ := (λ3 − λ2 )I
which is a continuous and piecewise continuously differential
function of time and referring to (9), has the following final
value:
ϕ(T ) = κI(T ) > 0.
(14)
where positivity comes from κ > 0, and I > 0 according to
lemma 1. Introduction of ϕ, along with λ0 = 1 and λ4 ≡ 0,
allow us to rewrite the Hamiltonian in (7) as follows:
H = f + (λ2 − λ1 )βu0 IS − λ1 q − λ2 b + ϕν.

(15)

According to Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, we have:
H(S, I, D, ν, λ1 , λ2 , λ3 ) ≥ H(S, I, D, ν, λ1 , λ2 , λ3 )
over all admissible ν.

(16)

Hence, the optimal ν satisfies ϕν ≥ ϕν, where ν is any
admissible controller, i.e., ν ∈ [0 . . . νmax ]. Thus, to find the
optimal controller, one needs to maximize the linear function
ϕν over the admissible set ν ∈ [0 . . . νmax ], which yields:
(
0,
ϕ<0
ν=
(17)
νmax , ϕ > 0,
hence, the name switching function. An immediate observation
of the above property is the following important property:
ϕν ≥ 0.

(18)

Also note that according to the continuity of the ϕ and its
final value (14) and following (17), we have ν = νmax over an
interval of nonzero length toward the end of (0 . . . T ) interval
which extends until time T. Specifically, we have ν(T ) =
νmax and ν at T is differentiable and ν̇(T ) = 0.
Now, in order to establish the statement of the theorem, we
will show that the switching function ϕ has at most one zerocrossing point. We show this by proving that the right side
time derivative of ϕ at its potential zero-crossing points are
necessarily (strictly) positive. Towards this end, we need to
establish three lemmas first.
Let us begin by stating a simple real analysis property which
we prove in Appendix A of our tech. report [34].
Property 1: Let f (t) be a continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable function of t. Assume f (t0 ) > L. Now

if f (t1 ) = L for the first time before t0 , i.e., f (t1 ) = L and
6
f (t) > L for all t ∈ (t1 . . . t0 ], then f˙(t+
1 ) ≥ 0.
Lemma 3: H = constant > 0.
Proof: As we argued in section III, the system is autonomous, and thus the Hamiltonian is a constant. Therefore,
H = H(T ) = f (I(T )) + κν(T )I(T ).

(19)

Following lemma 1, I(T ) > 0; also ν(T ) = νmax > 0, as we
argued after (17). Thus H(T ) > 0.
Lemma 4: For all t ∈ (0 . . . T ), we have λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0
and (λ2 − λ1 ) > 0.
Proof: Step-1. Following (9), λ2 (T ) = (λ2 (T ) −
λ1 (T )) = 0. From the discussion following inequality (18), ν
is continuous at T. Thus, from (8) and (9), λ̇2 (T ) = (λ̇2 (T ) −
λ̇1 (T )) = −f ′ (I(T )) − κνmax , which is strictly negative
due to lemma 1 and the discussion following inequality (18).
Also, again from (8) and (9), λ1 (T ) = λ̇1 (T ) = 0, and by
taking the time derivative of (8) and using (9), we obtain
λ̈1 (T ) = −λ̇2 (T )βu0 I(T ) > 0. Therefore, λ1 (t), λ2 (t) and
(λ2 (t)−λ1 (t)) are strictly positive over an interval of nonzero
length towards the end of interval (0 . . . T ).
Step-2. Proof by contradiction. Let t∗ be the last time at
which (at least) one of these three non-negativity constraints
is active, i.e., for t∗ < t < T, we have:
λ1 (t) > 0, λ2 (t) > 0, (λ2 (t) − λ1 (t)) > 0. and:
λ1 (t∗ ) = 0 OR λ2 (t∗ ) = 0 OR λ2 (t∗ ) − λ1 (t∗ ) = 0.
•

Case 1: λ2 (t∗ )−λ1 (t∗ ) = 0 and λ1 (t∗ ) ≥ 0 and λ2 (t∗ ) ≥
0. Now:
(λ̇2 (t∗+ ) − λ̇1 (t∗+ ))
= −f ′ + λ2 b′ − (λ3 − λ2 )ν − λ1 q ′ [∵(8)]
= −f ′ + λ2 b′ − (λ3 − λ2 )ν − λ1 q ′
H
f
λ1 q λ2 b ϕν
− + −
−
+
[∵(15)]
I
I
I
I
I
1
λ2
λ1 q
H
= [f − f ′ I] + [b′ I − b] − λ1 q ′ −
−
I
I
I
I
(20)

•

•

From lemma 2, [f − f ′ I] ≤ 0 and [b′ I − b] ≤ 0. From
the definition of t∗ , λ1 (t∗+ ) ≥ 0 and λ2 (t∗+ ) ≥ 0. Now
following Lemmas 1 and 3 and (20) and properties of
d
q(S), we observe that [ dt
(λ2 − λ1 )]|t∗+ < 0. According
to property 1, this is a contradiction. Thus, case 1 could
not occur.
Case 2: λ1 (t∗ ) = 0, λ2 (t∗ ) ≥ 0 and λ2 (t∗ ) − λ(t∗ ) > 0,
Then, from (8), λ̇1 (t∗+ ) = −(λ2 − λ1 )βu0 I. Since in
this case (λ2 (t∗ ) − λ1 (t∗ )) > 0, thus λ̇1 (t∗+ ) < 0 which
is in contradiction with property 1. Hence case 2 is also
impossible.
Case 3: λ1 (t∗ ) > 0, λ2 (t∗ ) − λ1 (t∗ ) > 0 and λ2 (t∗ ) = 0.
Thence, from (8),λ̇2 (t∗+ ) = −f ′ − (λ2 − λ1 )βS − ϕν
I .
For this case (λ2 (t∗ ) − λ1 (t∗ )) > 0. These inequalities
along with (18) and lemma 1, show λ̇2 (t∗+ ) < 0. This
is again in contradiction with property 1.

6 For a general function f (x), the notations f (x+ ) and f (x− ) are defined
0
0
as limx↓x0 f (x) and limx↑x0 f (x), respectively.

Therefore, none of the three cases could occur, which is a
contradiction with existence of t∗ . Hence, follows the lemma.
Here, we state another general property of differentiable
functions whose proof can be found in Appendix B of our
tech. report [34].
Property 2: Assume f (t) is a continuous and piecewise
continuously differentiable function of t. Assume t1 and t2
to be its two consecutive L-crossing points, that is, f (t1 ) =
f (t2 ) = L and f (t) 6= L for all t1 < t < t2 . Now if f˙(t+
1 ) 6= 0
˙ +
˙ −
and f˙(t−
2 ) 6= 0, then f (t1 ) and f (t2 ) must have opposite
signs.
Let us calculate the time derivative of the ϕ function
wherever ν is continuous:
ϕ
ϕ̇ = (λ̇3 − λ̇2 )I + I˙
[∵(13)]
I
′
′
= (f + (λ2 − λ1 )βu0 S − λ2 b
ϕ
+(λ3 − λ2 )ν)I + I˙
[∵(8)]
I
ϕ
= f ′ I + (λ2 − λ1 )βu0 IS − λ2 b′ I + ϕν + I˙
I
+(H − f − (λ2 − λ1 )βu0 IS + λ1 q
+λ2 b − ϕν) [∵(15)]
ϕ
= H + λ1 q + (f ′ I − f ) + λ2 (b − b′ I) + I˙ .
(21)
I
Let a time at which ϕ = 0 be denoted by τ. From (21) we
obtain:
ϕ̇(τ + ) = ϕ̇(τ − ) = H + λ1 q + (f ′ I − f ) + λ2 (b − b′ I)
(22)
Equation (22) and Lemmas 1, 3, 2, 4 show that ϕ̇(τ ) > 0.
Firstly, this shows that ϕ cannot be equal to zero over an
interval of nonzero length, since that requires ϕ̇ = 0 over that
interval, which is not possible. Thus, referring to (17), ν is
bang-bang, i.e., ν ∈ {0, νmax }.
Secondly, referring to property 2, we conclude that ϕ has
at most one zero-crossing point. Note that according to (17),
ν can have jump only at zero-crossing points of ϕ. Now to
find the direction of the jump, we note that according to (14),
continuity of ϕ and (17), ν = νmax for an interval of nonzero
length towards the end of the (0 . . . T ). Thus, the Theorem
follows.

V. DYNAMIC C ONTROL

OF THE SCANNING RATE / TX
RANGE

In this section, we assume that the worm has selected a
killing rate ν0 ≥ 0 a priori and it is fixed throughout the
optimization period and the attacker seeks to determine the
optimum u(.).
e) Convex h(u): Recall that both b(I) and q(S) satisfy
b(0) = q(0) = 0, and b(I), q(S) are increasing functions
of I, S for I, S ∈ [0 . . . 1]. Assume further that there exist
constants b̂ and q̂ such that
∀I, S ∈ [0 . . . 1],

b(I) ≥ b̂I and q(S) ≥ q̂S.

(23)

βumax is the maximum rate of the spread of the infection, and
intuitively, the above condition describes the scenario in which
the recovery rate (healing + immunization) is larger than the
rate of the spread of the infection. We present the structural
characteristics of the optimal u in such fast-healing regime
in Theorem 2. We show that the optimal transmission range
times scanning rate of the infective nodes is a non-increasing
function of time that necessarily ends at umin .
Theorem 2: Any optimal u(t) that maximizes the worm’s
damage function in (3) for the case of static killing rate and
convex h(u), is constituted of the following phases:
1) u = umax on 0 < t ≤ t0 < T for some t0 ≥ 0;
2) u strictly and continually decreases on t0 < t ≤ t1 < T
for some t1 ≥ t0 ;
3) u = 0 on t1 < t ≤ T.
f) Concave h(u):
Theorem 3: Any optimal u(t) that maximizes the worm’s
damage function in (3) for the case of static killing rate, and a
concave h(u), has the following characteristic: ∃t1 ∈ [0 . . . T )
such that u(t) = umax for 0 < t < t1 and u(t) = umin for
t1 < t < T.
The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 are similar to the proof of
Theorem 1 and are transferred to our tech. report [28] due to
the space constraint.
VI. N UMERICAL C OMPUTATIONS
Our numerical computations have been designed to complement our analysis in the previous two sections. We use the
insights revealed by these computations in designing robust
counter-measures.
We choose T = 10, I0 = 0.1, β = 0.6, umax = 1, νmax = 1
h(u) = u2 (which is a convex function) and C = 5. We
selected C such that u(t) = umax for all t ∈ [0, T ] violates the
constraint of (4b) Also, we assume that Q(x) = B(x) = γ for
all x ∈ [0, 1], i.e., q(S) = γS and b(I) = γI. The equal rates

are justified if we assume that there is one type of security
patch which successfully removes the infection, if any, and
immunizes a node against future infection.
Our first observation is that for all the range of parameters that will follow in this section, the structural results of
Theorems 1 and 2 for the optimal solution hold, although
they were shown assuming that only one of the controllers
is dynamic (i.e., only one is allowed to vary as a function
of time and the other is chosen as a constant), whereas here,
both u(t) and ν(t) are chosen dynamically by the attacker
(i.e., both u, ν are allowed to vary as functions of time).
In addition, Theorem 2 was shown assuming a fast healing
regime while we observe that the results are valid for cases
that are not fast-healing as well. Owing to space constraints,
we present only one corroborating figure, Fig. 2, which depicts
the optimal controllers as well as the states as functions of
time. Henceforth, we continue to consider the case in which
the worm dynamically selects both u, ν. This reveals the full
damage potential of the worm.
Next, we investigate the effect that changing γ causes on
the optimal controllers. According to Fig. 3 and our other
computation results, we observe that increasing the recovery
rate generally (a) decreases the jump time in the ν; (b) extends
the initial period during which u = umax and makes the
subsequent descent in u sharper. Intuitively, these phenomena
can be explained in the following manner: In a system with
large recovery rate, both the susceptible and infective nodes
are recovered rapidly. Hence, the worm should use more of its
power resources early on and also starts killing them earlier
in order to not lose many nodes to the pool of recovered.
jump points of ν versus γ for different values of κ
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Now, considering the supremum of such constants, we assume
to have:
b̂ + q̂ ≥ βumax
(24)
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Fig. 3: Jump points of optimal ν versus γ for values of κ = 0.2, 1, 4.
Here, f (I) = 32 I 2 , and γ = 0.1.
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Fig. 2: Evaluation of the optimal controllers and the according states
as functions of time. Specific parameters used are f (I) = 32 I 2 , κ =
4, γ = 0.1

Finally, we consider the problem of choosing the best
parameters from the viewpoint of the system. Specifically, the
system chooses the recovery rate a priori for a worst case
scenario, which is when the attacker knows the parameters
of the system (including the recovery rate) and chooses the
optimal dynamic attack policy. As anticipated, our numerical
computations reveal that higher the recovery rate (the sum
of the immunization and healing rates which is 2γ in this
case), the less is the damage due to the attack. For example,
Fig. 4 depicts the damage inflicted by the worm versus γ (
γ is varied between 0.10 to 0.37) for 3 different examples
of damage functions: f (I) = I, f (I) = 3/2I 2 , f (I) = 2I 3

and f (I) = 0.5(eI − 1)/(e − 2). The coefficients in f (I)
are chosen such that all of these functions have the same
average for I from 0 to 1. But, increasing the recovery rate
is achieved through greater usage of costly resources such as
bandwidth and power, and thereby inflicts a recovery cost on
the system. We consider the overall system cost as the sum of
the damage caused by the worm and the expense of providing
the immunization and healing rates of γ. The system faces a
trade-off in choosing the least-costly recovery rate, which we
resolve numerically. In the examples provided in this paper
(Fig. 4), we have plotted the overall system cost assuming
a simple linear recovery cost induced by γ (specifically 4γ),
and the damage functions described above in this paragraph.
In each case, the overall cost is minimized at a unique value
of γ: γ = 0.34, 0.25, 0.22, 0.19 in the figures respectively.

worm damage versus γ for different functions of f(I)
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Fig. 4: Worm damage and system cost versus γ for different functions
of f (I). Here, κ = 4.
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